

**SECRET**

26 March 1951

**MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

**VIA: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (H.A.H.)**

**SUBJECT: Responsibility for the Provision of Intelligence Support for the National Psychological Warfare Effort**

1. Reference is made to Mr. Wisner's memorandum of 21 March 1951 in which he told of the discussion in the NPSB regarding the responsibility of CIA to provide intelligence support for psychological warfare.

2. It is suggested that at the next meeting he seek to amend paragraph 21 of the draft under consideration to read as follows:

"The CIA will see that appropriate intelligence support is provided for psychological warfare and that the intelligence activities of government departments and agencies in this field are properly coordinated."

3. This change recognizes the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence to see that there is appropriate intelligence support for psychological warfare without saying that CIA must itself provide it.

4. In arguing in favor of this change, it might be pointed out that the plan for psychological warfare on which the NPSB is working only seeks to place the responsibility for providing intelligence support. It would be inappropriate for the NPSB to prescribe the detailed arrangements by which the Director of Central Intelligence will accomplish this end.

5. The detailed arrangements for furnishing this support will be made by CIA after consulting with the interested agencies. CIA is now engaged in exploring the problem with the various units in each agency as to define precisely what their needs are and how each need can best be met. It is expected that this survey will be completed shortly and that satisfactory procedures can then be set up.

6. If, in the course of the discussion at the NPSB, it appears that the other agencies want to commit CIA to approve all psychological research done in other agencies and forward such research to the requestor, it should be pointed out that this is a detail regarding how the Director of Central Intelligence will discharge his responsibility. If the CIA can assure itself in some way of the quality and timeliness of a research paper, there is nothing to be gained by CIA acting as a middle man between the producer and the requestor. The Director of Central Intelligence must decide for himself what he needs in order to be sufficiently assured on these points.

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Acting Assistant Director,  
Intelligence Coordination